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India’s Soft Power: 
From Potential to Reality?  
Nicolas Blarel
Over the last decade, many scholars and analysts have tried to assess India’s emergence as a major actor in the global arena by looking at such material indicators as economic 
growth, military expansion or demographic evolution. As a consequence, these accounts 
have mainly overlooked New Delhi’s increased emphasis on developing its ‘soft power’ 
credentials by using the attractiveness of Indian culture, values and policies. Indian diplomats 
like Sashi Tharoor have recently argued that if India is now perceived as a superpower, 
it was not just through trade and politics but also through its ability to share its culture 
with the world through food, music, technology and Bollywood. However, it is diffi cult to 
determine India’s actual soft power resources, or which of these resources have actually 
helped strengthen India’s global status. With such a diffi cult concept to defi ne and measure, 
is it possible to monitor the evolution of India’s soft power over the last decade? Most 
saliently, can we compare India’s efforts with those of another emerging Asian power, China? 
CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING INDIA’S SOFT POWER 
‘Power’ in International Relations (IR) has traditionally been defi ned in relational terms: as the ability of 
actor A to infl uence the behaviour of actor B to get the outcomes he wants. Traditional (neo-) realist 
models have emphasised military strength and economic power to determine state capacities. By contrast, 
in his seminal book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, eminent IR scholar Joseph 
Nye separated three dimensions of power: coercion by using military threats, infl uence by offering 
economic incentives, and fi nally the ability to co-opt other states or what he also called a ‘soft power’ 
approach (in contrast to the two previous ‘hard power’ approaches). According to Nye, co-optive power 
is ‘the ability of a nation to structure a situation so that other nations develop preferences or defi ne 
their interests in ways consistent with one’s nation.’ Nye also argued co-optive power emerges from 
soft power and immaterial sources such as ‘cultural and ideological attraction as well as the rules and 
institutions of international regimes.’ As a result, the difference between hard and soft power relies on 
their relative materiality as soft power is mostly based on intangibles such as the power of example. Soft 
power is therefore the ability to modify other states’ preferences because of their perception of you.  
However, as the Indian case will demonstrate, the conceptual relationship between hard and soft power 
remains unclear. Does a rising power need to develop both hard power and soft power resources to 
attain major power status? Do both dimensions of power substitute each other or do they overlap in 
a complementary way? Does India today fi ll these two prerequisites? For instance, the high economic 
growth rates since the liberalisation process in 1991 have certainly increased India’s international 
attractiveness; does economic power here feed India’s soft power?  
In the last decade, India’s soft power has mainly been defi ned in opposition to hard power considerations. 
For example, the most eloquent proponent of India’s soft power, former Union Minister of State 
for External Affairs Shashi Tharoor, has argued that past classifi cations of major power status were 
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becoming archaic and that India had now become 
a great power mainly by the ‘power of example’ or 
in other words because of its ‘soft power’. Tharoor’s 
contention is that today it is not the size of the army or 
of the economy that matters (two dimensions where 
India has failed to compete with other great powers 
like China or the US) but instead it was the country 
that told the ‘better story’ which would qualify as 
a global player. To support this argument, Tharoor 
has discussed components of India’s soft power as 
diverse as fi lms and Bollywood, yoga, ayurveda, 
political pluralism, religious diversity and openness 
to global infl uences. While the successful export 
of cultural products such as Bollywood across the 
world has helped raise awareness of Indian culture 
and modifi ed existing stereotypes, other soft power 
elements such as the institutional model of a long-
lasting democratic and plural political system have also 
inspired societies abroad.  
But Tharoor also believed India’s soft power had 
emerged until now independently of the government’s 
policies. In other words, a soft power by default, India 
has now to enhance its co-optive power. What are 
India’s soft power assets? How have these resources 
improved India’s international reputation?  
THE INDIRECT AND INCONSISTENT NATURE OF 
INDIA’S SOFT POWER 
Since soft power is an intangible component of a 
state’s power, it is diffi cult to measure its actual impact. 
The advantages of hard power such as military and 
economic resources are that they can be measured 
and compared, and their direct effects are more or 
less palpable. It is easy for example to compare Indian 
and Chinese military expenditures. It is impossible 
however to quantify the appeal of a country’s values, 
culture, institutions or achievements, an appeal which 
is inherently subjective and therefore contested and 
fl uctuating. Furthermore, the indirect nature of India’s 
soft power is more diffi cult to ascertain. It is for example 
diffi cult to assess whether a foreign government 
acceded to India’s foreign policy objectives because 
of its partiality towards Indian culture. Nevertheless, 
in spite of these caveats, some observers of India’s 
foreign policy have noticed how certain characteristics 
of India’s history, culture and political development 
have progressively gained foreign attention.
How these soft power qualities have actually been 
actively used by Indian diplomacy to exert international 
infl uence is another matter.  
In the last decade, Indian diplomats have started 
emphasising the appealing and also ‘familiar’ 
nature of India’s culture. India has a long history of 
civilisational and cultural links with countries in Central 
Asia, South-East Asia and the Middle-East. Its riches 
have attracted traders and travellers for thousands 
of years. Buddhism spread from India to China and 
beyond, leading to a sustained exchange of ideas 
since ancient times. Even today, the proposal by India 
to rebuild the once internationally famous Nalanda 
Buddhist University in partnership with China, Japan, 
South Korea and Singapore serves as testament to 
those historic cultural ties. Similarly, preachers from 
India have spread the values of Islam across Asia to 
Singapore and Malaysia. Such historical, cultural and 
religious ties built along trading routes were regularly 
raised by Indian diplomats as they sought to improve 
relations with South-East Asia through the ‘Look East’ 
policy in the early 1990s, emphasising in particular 
the religious infl uences of Hinduism and Buddhism, 
as well as the spread of language (especially Sanskrit), 
art and architecture throughout Southeast Asia. Today, 
as India also tries to re-establish economic relations 
with the Gulf countries, it regularly evokes pre-colonial 
commercial routes as well as centuries-old cultural-
religious linkages.  
Today, alongside China, India offers one of the most 
dynamic alternatives to Western cultural values. India’s 
fi lm industry, popularly dubbed ‘Bollywood’, is probably 
the largest and farthest reaching medium for Indian 
culture. It is today the world’s largest fi lm industry, 
surpassing Hollywood with an annual output of over 
1000 movies. Thanks to satellite TV and internet, 
Bollywood movies and Indian soap operas have 
reached a growing global audience that has become 
increasingly familiar with Indian society and culture. 
Another one of India’s most successful and long-lasting 
exports, yoga, is now practiced around the world as a 
form of exercise, and Indian cuisine, with its distinctive 
use of spices, has become popular worldwide. More 
directly, cricket has proved to be a strong soft power 
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resource for India, with cricket diplomacy having notably 
positive effects in reducing Indo-Pakistani tensions. 
Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s meeting 
with Indian Prime minister Manmohan Singh during 
the 2011 world cup semi-fi nal in India closely followed 
the resumption of high-level diplomatic dialogue 
between New Delhi and Islamabad after the 2008 
Mumbai attacks. On another level, the creation in 
2008 of the rich and internationally-popular Indian 
Premier League (IPL) has reinforced the narrative of 
India’s rise. 
However, while the exportation of these cultural 
products has certainly made aspects of life in the 
Indian subcontinent more familiar and accessible to 
people across the globe, it is not evident how this 
element of India’s soft power has helped India fulfi l its 
foreign policy objectives in the last decade. Whereas 
Nye could link American popular culture with the US’ 
‘co-optive’ power, the effects of the globalisation of 
India’s diverse culture are not so explicitly political. 
For example, unlike Hollywood’s approach during the 
Cold War, Indian fi lms have never really promoted a 
certain model for political and cultural development. 
India’s large diaspora is also considered to be a major 
asset for Indian diplomacy. There are today millions 
of Indians spread as far as Fiji, Malaysia, Mauritius, 
South Africa and Trinidad. While many of these Indians 
originally migrated as labourers for the British Empire 
in the 19th century, a new wage of richer and educated 
expatriates have found their way to the US, Canada 
and Australia in the last decades. These immigrants 
have come to play major roles in the political spheres 
of these different countries. For example, the educated 
Indian-American community has played an important 
role in improving Indo-US relations by lobbying 
American politicians and by giving a positive image 
of India to the American public.  
Nye argued that ‘smart’ states can increase their 
credibility and soft power capacity by their domestic 
and international performance. India’s democratic 
record, unprecedented for most decolonised countries 
could be regarded as a strong soft power resource. The 
new international consensus following the Cold War 
around democracy, human rights and market-oriented 
economic reforms has reinforced the appeal of India’s 
political achievements. The stability of India’s democracy 
over more than 60 years, especially in a neighbourhood 
rife with ethnic confl icts, has demonstrated that unity 
in diversity was possible in a democratic format and 
there could be an institutional alternative to Western 
political systems. India’s democratic, federal and secular 
political model (although not always perfect) could 
be considered as an institutional model of reasonable 
accommodation of minority rights, and of fl exible 
adjustment to different ethnic and linguistic claims.  
While economic power is usually considered a hard 
and material asset, a country’s economic development 
model could also be interpreted as a soft power 
resource to the extent that its accomplishments prove 
attractive to others. The recent global successes of 
Indian information technology fi rms such as Infosys 
Technologies and Wipro, the achievements of other 
multinational companies such as the Tata Group and 
the Reliance Group; and the now global reputation 
of the Indian Institute of Management (IIMs) and 
Indian Institute of Technology (IITs) have contributed 
to the development of a new image of India as an 
economic powerhouse. The stereotypical image of 
underdeveloped, impoverished India has now been 
removed by the impression of a modern and dynamic 
economy attracting now foreign investments and 
workers from different parts of the world.  
Soft power is however a diffi cult resource to leverage, 
and India’s political leadership and its diplomatic 
instrument have inconsistently capitalised upon these 
undoubted soft power resources over the last decade. 
References to Indian culture, to its diaspora, to its 
political values and to its economic development have 
mostly been rhetoric for image-polishing. It poses the 
question of whether India has really tried to exploit 
its huge soft power potential.
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DEVELOPING A SOFT POWER COMPONENT TO 
INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY  
In practice, India’s soft power remains weak for two 
primary reasons. First, Indian diplomacy has neglected 
soft power as an important tool of statecraft and has 
only recently understood the relevance of ‘cultural 
diplomacy’. Second, soft power cannot really exist 
without some initial hard power achievements. A 
country will only be able to realistically tell a ‘better 
story’ if it has material power to build its soft power 
on. While goodwill for India abroad has largely been 
generated in an unplanned manner, New Delhi does 
have the capacity to accentuate soft power through 
‘public diplomacy’ or by developing a framework of 
activities by which a government seeks to infl uence 
public attitudes in a manner that they become 
supportive of its foreign policy and national interests. 
India has recently demonstrated the intention to 
exploit its soft power resources in a systematic manner 
to achieve its objectives, notably by creating a Public 
Diplomacy Division in India’s Ministry of External Affairs 
in 2006. This new institution’s main objective has 
been to intensify the dialogue on foreign policy issues 
with all segments of the society at home and abroad. 
However, it is a fairly new and small department 
and its ability to formulate and implement policies 
remains to be seen.
As a result, India has over the last 5 years attempted 
to begin to make better use of its soft power assets. 
Most notably, the Indian government has explicitly 
incorporated a ‘cultural’ element into its foreign 
policy. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) 
has set up 22 cultural centres in 19 countries whose 
activities ranging from fi lm festivals to book fairs and 
art exhibitions, aim to present an image of India as a 
plural multicultural society. The Indian government has 
also encouraged the use of Hindi abroad by organising 
an annual and rotating World Hindi Conference and 
by offering Hindi classes in its different centres. 
India has also begun to emphasise its democratic 
process. Despite India’s important democratic 
achievements, New Delhi had historically shied away 
from promoting democracy abroad, but since 2000 
India has expanded its activities for the development 
of democracy abroad, notably in coordination with 
the international community. In 2005, India joined the 
UN Democracy Fund and contributed $25 million to 
it, making it the second biggest donor after the US 
($38 million). India’s activities mainly include electoral 
assistance and programs to strengthen the rule of law 
and to fi ght corruption. At the regional level, India has 
also decided to link its development assistance with 
projects of democracy promotion as in Afghanistan. 
The Afghanistan example is interesting as India has 
direct national interests at stake in the stabilisation of 
that country. However, India has deliberately refused to 
send any military mission and instead pursued a soft 
power strategy to gain Afghan goodwill by delivering 
$1.3 billion in economic and logistical assistance. Since 
2001, India has concentrated on the reconstruction 
of Afghanistan through aid for building infrastructure 
like dams and roads and providing scholarships for 
Afghan students. Ordinary Afghans seem to have 
appreciated India’s ‘soft’ involvement in their country 
as 74 percent of them have a favourable image of 
India according to a 2009 ABC/BBC/ARD poll (in 
contrast to 91 percent of unfavourable opinions of 
Pakistan). Elsewhere in the region, India has promoted 
a soft power approach through a series of new 
initiatives framed around concepts of ‘non-reciprocity’, 
‘connectivity’ and ‘asymmetrical responsibilities’, which 
indicate a willingness to use economic attractiveness 
to persuade its neighbours rather than coercive 
military capacities. This has resulted since the 1980s 
in a greater political investment in different regional 
institutions such as the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the South Asia Co-
operative Environment Programme, the South Asian 
Economic Union and BIMSTEC which were created 
to enhance cultural and commercial ties. Similarly, 
in order to rebuild its trust defi cit with countries like 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka, India has recently increased 
economic cooperation notably by negotiating free 
trade agreements. Following the signing of a bilateral 
free trade agreement in 2000, Indo-Sri Lankan trade 
rose 128 percent by 2004 and quadrupled by 2006, 
reaching $2.6 billion. In November 2011, Pakistan 
also took further steps toward normal trade and travel 
ties with India, agreeing to open up most areas of 
commerce with its larger neighbour and to ease visa 
rules by February 2012. 
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India has also progressively tried to include its diaspora 
into its foreign policy strategies. Beginning in the 
1990s, it became clear that the Overseas Chinese 
community was contributing to China’s economic 
development. In reaction, India began outreach efforts 
to wealthier expatriates who were well situated to play 
a vital role in strengthening ties between India and 
other countries. The government established in 2000 
a High-Level Committee on Indian Diaspora to review 
the status of People of Indian Origin (PIOs) and Non-
Resident Indians (NRIs) in the context of constitutional 
provisions, laws and rules applicable to them both in 
India and countries of their residence. By studying 
the characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of this 
community, which represents twenty million people 
worldwide, this committee aimed to study the role 
that PIOs and NRIs may play in the economic, social 
and technological development of India. In exchange 
for their contribution and based on the committee’s 
recommendations, the Indian government reformed 
citizenship requirements in 2004 and eased the legal 
regime governing the travel and stay of PIOs in India. 
A case in point of such cooperation was the decisive 
role of the Indian-American community in improving 
India’s image in American minds which greatly 
contributed to the recent Indo-US rapprochement. 
The lobbying efforts carried by the US India Political 
Action Committee (USINPAC) proved to be crucial to 
get the much debated Indo-US nuclear deal passed 
in the US Congress.
Soft power has now become an active element of 
India’s diplomacy in parallel with the development 
of its hard power resources. India has progressively 
understood that these two dimensions of power 
should not be placed in opposition to one another, 
especially for an aspiring global power. India’s political 
and economic appeal would not be possible if it had 
not developed robust political institutions over the 
last 60 years and sustained high economic growth 
rates over the last two decades. Similarly, as India’s 
hard power capabilities, notably in the economic and 
military realms, have increased over the last decade, 
it became important to develop in conjunction a soft 
power strategy to give legitimacy and credibility to 
India’s leadership role in the world.  
As the world’s largest democracy, with a vibrant free 
press, India has important soft power advantages over 
the other rising power in the region, China. Because 
of India’s democratic experience, its rise (unlike China) 
has been perceived as complementing rather than 
challenging the existing Asian and international orders. 
Not coincidentally, India’s public diplomacy over the 
last 5 years has sought to promote its soft power 
credentials in a battle for infl uence with China in 
Asia and around the world. A concrete example of 
this new soft power rivalry is visible in Africa today. 
Since India cannot match China’s massive fi nancial 
investments in Africa, it has been concentrating on soft 
power resources such as its information technology 
capabilities and its affordable university courses to 
attract African students. At the same time it has 
promoted its image of the country which inspired the 
anti-colonial struggles of the last century and took a 
strong principled stand against apartheid to develop 
future partnerships in Africa. As a result, by publicising 
the pluralist nature of its politics and society, India 
intends to prove it is a cooperating, stabilising and 
exemplary rising power, in contrast to China’s more 
aggressive, if not neo-colonial model.  
CONCLUSION: INDIA’S SOFT POWER AS A WORK 
IN PROGRESS?  
The Indian government’s efforts over the last decade 
have helped promote a new and modern image of 
India abroad. The increase in foreign direct investments 
in recent years (investment infl ows of fi nancial year 
2006-07 touched over $13 billion, as compared with 
$16.5 billion over the whole of the 1990s) may partly 
be due to these publicity campaigns that promoted 
India’s soft power capacities. Post-liberalisation India 
is progressively being seen as a manufacturing hub 
for international fi rms that are making long-term 
productive investments in the country. Coincidentally 
or not, simultaneously many aspects of Indian culture 
like music, food, style and religions have become 
fashionable in many parts of the world. However, since 
India did not have any meaningful public diplomacy 
program until recently, it is not yet perceived as a 
political and societal model in other countries.
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India has long been content with its indirect soft power capacities. In comparison with Beijing’s well-organised 
and centrally mandated ‘charm offensive,’ India’s public diplomacy is still in formation.
To increase its international clout, notably in its growing competition with China over which power tells the 
‘better story,’ India will have to use its soft power in a more systematic and planned manner. This process 
will most probably take time as it will require a domestic debate on how to balance national interests and 
political values and norms. The resolution of this debate will determine how India fi nds a right mix between 
soft and hard power in order to achieve real infl uence, or what Nye, and many in the Obama administration, 
in particular Hillary Clinton, have termed ‘smart power.’ For India to continue to be an attractive power, and 
most importantly for it to present a more compelling development model than China, it will also need to 
continue to improve its internal economic performance.  
In addition, since soft power has a fl uctuating value, India will need to resolve its lack of social and economic 
equality if it wants to retain its soft power edge. One of the major factors in the rise of India’s profi le has 
been its impressive economic growth since the early 1990s. Suddenly, India became an appealing economic 
model, one that presented a different option from the centralized and authoritarian Chinese model. But the 
maintenance of this positive international image will require India to simultaneously become a more equitable 
and effi cient society, a global economic power, and an economy that commands a major share of the global 
wealth, especially from global trade and investment. Decreasing FDI over the last two years cannot solely be 
explained by the global economic crisis. India’s lack of proper physical infrastructure, constraining federal 
regulations, large and ineffi cient bureaucratic structures and the perception of massive corruption have all 
deterred major investors. Indeed, the popular mobilisation behind anti-corruption crusader Anna Hazare and 
the associated civil unrest demonstrates that India still has a way to go to implement the macro-economic 
and structural reforms that will enable it to become an inclusive and prosperous economic reference, and 
with that, a soft power superpower. ■ 
